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ATCA: CLOSING THE GAP IN
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL WAR CRIMES
INTRODUCTION

W

hen Israel’s 2006 military bombing campaign in Lebanon
wrought destruction of both the infrastructure of the country as
well as the natural environment, the environmental impact of warfare
was once again brought to public consciousness.1 This kind of wanton
destruction of the environment has been condemned by the international
community,2 and prohibitions against it are found in several treaties, including the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949
(“Additional Protocol I”),3 the Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Modification Techniques (“ENMOD”),4 and the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”).5 However, the lack
of criminal prosecution for environmental war crimes since Nuremburg6
1. See, e.g., Hassan M. Fattah, Casualties of War: Lebanon’s Trees, Air and Sea,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/29/world
/middleeast/29environment.html?ex=1311825600&en=34075758dfbd9790&ei=5088&pa
rtner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Richard Black, Environmental Crisis in Lebanon, BBC NEWS,
July 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5233358.stm; Bassem Mroue,
Lebanon Sees Environmental Damage, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/01/AR2006080100672.
html.
2. For example, the United Nations (“U.N.”) General Secretary issued a message on
The International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and
Armed Conflict expressing the U.N.’s view that countries in armed conflicts should “neither exploit[] nor heedlessly damage[] ecosystems in the pursuit of military objectives,”
and noting that “by and large the environmental consequences of war are overlooked by
contemporary laws;” the message also declares that “[i]t is high time that we review international agreements related to war and armed conflict to ensure that they also cover
deliberate and unintentional damage to the environment.” Message by the SecretaryGeneral of the U.N., Kofi Annan, International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of
the Environment in War and Armed Conflict, Nov. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/noticias/comunicados/7/27167/P2
7167.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpl-i/p6f.xsl&base=/prensa/tpl-i/top-bottom.xsl.
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
4. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614 [hereinafter ENMOD].
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. Carl E. Bruch, All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental
Damage in Internal Armed Conflict, 25 VT. L. REV. 695, 716 (2001).
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suggests that these international agreements do not provide an effective
deterrent. Furthermore, when military powerhouses such as the United
States refuse to be a party to most of these conventions,7 it is unlikely
that criminalization of these acts will succeed as a deterrent.
Civil liability for such destruction could be more effective. Some success in obtaining funds to clean up war-related environmental damage
has been achieved through the United Nations Compensation Commission (“UNCC”),8 which adjudicated claims brought against Iraq for actions it took during the Persian Gulf War. Though this demonstrates that
civil remedies pursued through international channels might be useful,
the relatively insubstantial damages recovered indicate potential problems with the UNCC as a tool of recovery against states.9 In the case of
Iraq, problems recovering had much to do with Iraq’s initial refusal to
cooperate with the United Nations.10 Application of the UNCC to future
civil claims may face additional challenges, namely the requirement that
a state fulfilling a judgment has sufficient and accessible wealth to draw
upon for such remedial measures.11
Taking into consideration the difficulties that inhere when attempting
to recover monetary relief from a state, it is possible that civil litigation
against private entities such as corporations could achieve better results.
There may be more to gain both in terms of financial compensation as
well as deterrence since the cost of participating in such large scale destruction could be prohibitive from the private sector perspective.
One potential avenue of relief that allows private individuals a right to
litigate for compensation is the United States Alien Tort Claims Act
(“ATCA”).12 The ATCA establishes jurisdiction for U.S. district courts
to hear any civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. Although said to apply
to “claims in a very limited category,”13 the ATCA has been used with
increasing frequency to bring charges against both corporations and pri7. See Protocol I, supra note 3; see Rome Statute, supra note 5. The United States is
not a party to Protocol I or the Rome Statute.
8. Meredith DuBarry Huston, Wartime Environmental Damages: Financing the
Clean-up, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 899, 911 (2002) (citing S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)).
9. Id. at 915.
10. Id. at 915−16. Compensation for the fund was to be derived from thirty percent of
Iraq’s exports of petroleum and petroleum products, but Iraq refused to comply. Instead,
frozen oil revenues held by other countries temporarily subsidized the fund.
11. Id. (citing Rosemary E. Libera, Note, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 301 (2001)).
12. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2003).
13. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
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vate individuals accused of violating “the law of nations.” It has met with
substantial success in actions brought against private individuals who
engaged in conduct that violated “well-established, universally recognized norms of international law.”14
This is not to say that the conventions criminalizing certain levels of
environmental destruction during combat would serve no purpose or
should never be asserted, but only that the penalty of cleaning up the destruction could provide a crucial economic barrier to corporations that
support military plans entailing great environmental damage. While
some have argued that litigation is neither effective nor efficient in
achieving goals that are ostensibly political in nature,15 the pressure applied to private corporations through prosecution of ATCA claims brings
public awareness to this crisis, and can deter those that customarily facilitate unlawful military operations. Furthermore, regular prosecution of
individuals or corporations for such activities can contribute to the international consensus that this environmental crime is one that reaches the
level of universal concern, and thus subjects the perpetrators to a wider
range of jurisdiction and a greater degree of accountability.
This Note will argue that the ATCA is an important tool that should be
utilized to hold private entities, such as corporations, accountable for
causing serious harm to the environment in the course of an armed conflict. In order to protect the environment and the health and well-being of
all its inhabitants, it is necessary to inhibit the reckless destruction of the
land and sea. The international community has not yet achieved the will
or means to do so. Applying punitive measures against those who perpetrate environmental war crimes is necessary and the ATCA can provide
such a precedent.
Part I of this Note will briefly describe the range of environmental
damage arising from armed conflict throughout history to the present
time. Part II will establish the existence of an international prohibition
against environmental destruction during warfare as evidenced in international agreements as well as in customary international law. Part III
will discuss the mechanisms in place to address the deterrence of such
conduct and examine the shortcomings of these methods. Part IV presents the ATCA as a viable alternative for discouraging environmental
harm. Part IV begins with a brief history of the ATCA followed by an
examination of how courts have responded to ATCA claims, highlighting
14. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. Bill Baue, “Win or Lose” in Court, BUSINESS-ETHICS.COM, Summer 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2006/06winlose.pdf#search=%22ali
en%20tort%20claims%20act%20pushes%20corporate%20respect%22.
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potential obstacles litigants may have to overcome. Discussion in this
section will include the legal argument for holding private entities such
as corporations liable for environmental torts during war. Part V will discuss the application of the ATCA to military defense contractors. The
Note will conclude with a policy argument for utilizing the ATCA in
U.S. courts, including the need to fill in the gap in accountability for environmental war crimes so that the perpetrators, and not victims or taxpayers, will be held fiscally responsible.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AS A BYPRODUCT OF
WARFARE
The history of environmental destruction during war, intended or incidental, is millennia old and notorious. A few milestones in the history of
environmental abuse include the alleged salting of the fields of Carthage
in the second century by the Romans during the Punic Wars,16 the Union
Army’s burning of thousands of farms and killing of livestock in the Civil War,17 the atomic blast that irradiated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
forests defoliated by Agent Orange during the Vietnam War,18 and the
deliberate spilling of millions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf and
the burning of over 500 oil fields by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War.19 More
recently, the armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon gave rise to yet
another wartime environmental disaster.20 Fallout from the bombing
campaign included an 87-mile long oil slick along the Lebanese shore.21
An estimated total of 35,000 tons of oil in the coastal waters threatened
the fishing and tourism industries and posed a serious threat to human
health from toxic substances such as benzene, a known carcinogen.22 As
a result, Lebanon, a country that prioritized the maintenance of a pristine
environment, faces the devastation of the entire marine ecosystem on its
16. Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes or Humanitarian Atrocities?, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 697, 700
(2005).
17. See Bruch, supra note 6, at 695 (citing BRUCE CATTAN, THE PENGUIN BOOK OF
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 240 (1960)).
18. John Alan Cohan, Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental
Protection under the International Law of War, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 481, 488 (2003) (citing Michael N. Schmiit, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 269 (1997)).
19. Id. at 488.
20. See, e.g., Fattah, supra note 1; Black, supra note 1.
21. Anthee Carassava, U.N. Pledges $64 Million for Cleanup of Oil Spill off Lebanon,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/world/
middleeast/18spill.html.
22. Id.
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shores.23 Furthermore, there is evidence that Israel, in this latest conflict,
used weapons that not only produce long term health effects in humans,
but contaminate the environment.24 Though U.N. forces and concerned
representatives of countries affected by the spillage have banded together
to clean up the waters,25 it is unclear how effective these measures will
be in restoring the ecosystem in the affected areas and preventing death
or sickness from exposure to the chemical substances in the water, or
how much money will ultimately be needed to sustain such a clean up.26
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION DURING WAR IS DELIMITED BY
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international community has for centuries recognized various rules
of war, otherwise known as jus in bello,27 some of which apply indirectly
to environmental destruction.28 Among these rules are three relevant
principles: necessity, proportionality, and humanity.29 Military necessity
23. In particular, the endangered turtles that hatch on the beaches in July are threatened, as well as the beds along the shore where tuna spawn. Mroue, supra note 1. Mroue
also points out that Lebanon has taken steps to combat the effects of pollution, unlike
many of its neighbors in the Middle East. For example, Lebanon has laws that prohibit
diesel minibuses and that curtail factory pollution. Id. This demonstrates how easily an
aggressor country using military force against another can destroy in a few hours the
benefits of any environmental progress made over the years by the country it attacks.
24. Dr. Doug Rokke, Bunker Buster Bombs Containing Depleted Uranium Warheads
Used By Israel Against Civilian Targets In Lebanon, GLOBAL RESEARCH, July 26, 2006,
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ROK2
0061106&articleId=3748; Israel Detonated a Radioactive Bunker Buster Bomb in Lebanon: What Kind of Weapon Leaves Traces of Radiation & Produces Such Lethal & Circumscribed Consequences?, GLOBAL RESEARCH, Nov. 11, 2006, available at http://www.
globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20061111&articleId=3813.
25. Carassava, supra note 21.
26. In August 2007, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the government of
Lebanon had collected sixty to seventy percent of the oil spill but was unable to complete
the clean up due to a lack of funding. Carol Huang, Oil Legacy of War Mars Lebanon
Coast, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/2007/0823/p06s02-wome.htm. Free-floating oil is still drifting ashore,
and the oil that remains on the shore and seafloor is reentering the sea. Id.
27. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (discussing the application of international law governing the capture of fishing vessels during wartime).
28. See, e.g., The Hague Convention II Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/law
ofwar/hague02.htm (prohibiting the employment of “poison or poisoned arms” and the
destruction or seizure of “the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”).
29. Cohan, supra note 18, at 491 (citing Capt. William A. Wilcos, Jr., Environmental
Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 299, 302 (1993)). See also Protocol I, supra note
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justifies applying any force required to win the complete and timely
submission of the enemy without violating the laws of war.30 The proportionality principle “prohibits methods of warfare likely to cause injury to
civilians in excess of any concrete direct military advantage,”31 while the
humanity principle prohibits “means of warfare that are inhumane.”32
The application of these principles to environmental destruction was asserted by members of the U.N. when the Security Council passed Resolution 687, which held Iraq liable for “any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage, and the depletion of natural resources” caused by
the Iraqi invasion.33 For example, the United States asserted that, with
respect to this damage, Iraq had violated the principles of necessity and
proportionality.34
The international community also has several international agreements
in place that delimit the range of environmental destruction tolerated during war. Some of the earlier conventions address the environment indirectly. For example, the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits the use of
“poison or poisoned weapons,” and the destruction or seizure of “the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”35 These principles were applied after
WWII to hold German industrialists who had over-exploited Polish forests for timber accountable.36

3. Protocol I limits military conduct in many instances to that deemed “necessary.” For
example, see articles 14(3)(b), 54(5), 62(1). Id.
30. Capt. William A. Wilcos, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 299, 302 (1993).
31. Cohan, supra note 18, at 494 (citing Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 165, 168 (1992)).
32. Id. at 495 (citing the Declaration of St. Petersburg Renouncing the Use, in Time
of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes in Weight, Nov. 29, 1868).
33. Lt. Col. Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment Of The Environmental
Law Of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 27 (S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)).
34. Id. at 27–28. However, there was not a consensus: “Other states referred to Protocol I and ENMOD, while a third group suggested that peacetime environmental law carried forward into periods of hostilities and applied in the case of the Gulf War.” Id.
35. Article 23(a) prohibits the use of “poison or poisoned weapons,” while article
23(h) deals with destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property. The Hague Convention
IV Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 23(a), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
36. Mark J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern
Warfare: Customary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
479, 486−87 (1993).
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Recognition of the seriousness of environmental harm grew when the
world witnessed the devastation of Vietnam’s forests by the use of the
herbicide Agent Orange, and thus the international community formulated conventions that would more directly address such environmental
destruction.37 The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, and the Rome Statute all contain language that makes it a violation of international law to exceed certain bounds of environmental destruction resulting from military combat.38 In addition, the international community has sought to prosecute
such violations through statutes adhering to ad hoc tribunals created to
punish war crimes violations. For example, article 13(b)(5) of the Iraqi
Statute contains language similar to the above-mentioned treaties.39
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROSCRIBING ENVIRONMENTAL
DESTRUCTION LACK EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The fact that neither states nor individuals have been held accountable
for war-related environmental crimes since Nuremburg,40 and that intense environmental destruction, as seen in the recent war between Israel
and Lebanon, continues without fear of retribution illustrates the ineffectiveness of these treaties as a deterrent.
Several reasons have been put forth to explain why these conventions
have not been successful tools in prosecuting environmental war crimes.
First of all, the language addressing the limits of environmental harm in
37. Cohan, supra note 18, at 485. See also Caggiano, supra note 36 at 488 (“The
nations of the world drafted [the Environmental Modification Convention] in response to
the massive, albeit unsuccessful attempts by the United States to use weather modification to harass the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam war.”) (citing Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 59 (1977)).
38. Weinstein, supra note 16 (citing Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T.
333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977); Rome Statute, supra note 5.
39. Id. at 706.
40. During the Nuremberg proceedings, General Alfred Jodl was found guilty of “war
crimes associated with scorched earth tactics in Northern Norway, Leningrad, and Moscow,” while certain German civilian officials were tried for “ruthless exploitation of Polish forestry.” Bruch, supra note 6 at 716 (citing the Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany,
pt.22, at 517 (1950) and Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting From The
Nato Military Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 125 (citing United
Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948)).
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both the Additional Protocol I and the Rome Statute has been described
as too vague and undefined.41 Both agreements proscribe “widespread,
long-term and severe” damage to the natural environment.42 The problem
is the difficulty of articulating what widespread, long-term and severe
mean.43 Furthermore, the requirement that all three factors, (wide-spread,
long-term, and severe) must be demonstrated, establishes a high threshold for criminal prosecution. Finally, with respect to the Rome Statute,
prosecution of military actors is difficult due to two other features of the
statute: it balances military concerns against environmental integrity and
requires proof of intent. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute makes it
a crime when
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.

The Rome Statute essentially tolerates environmental destruction when
it is undertaken to secure a military advantage, and is not “clearly excessive,” a term itself undefined. It is also unclear whether the “anticipated”
advantage is to be gauged on an objective or subjective standard. If
judged on a subjective standard, this would also create problems of
proof.44 The challenges that arise from this potential subjective standard
for judging military advantage are augmented by the need to prove that
an accused had knowledge that the environmental destruction in question
would result from the attack. In sum, it must be proven that 1) the individual responsible had knowledge that the attack would cause such damage and 2) that the perpetrator acted willingly to cause such destruction,
a much higher standard than that of recklessness or negligence.45 In addition, because the Rome Statute, which is applied through the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), cannot supersede national procedures, the

41. Weinstein, supra note 16, at 707; Cohan, supra note 18, at 502.
42. Protocol I, supra note 3; Rome Statute, supra note 5.
43. Huston, supra note 8, at 906. “Long-lasting” in the ENMOD Convention has been
interpreted in Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as
constituting a period of months or a season, while the Commentary to Protocol I defines
long-lasting as “matter of decades.” See ENMOD, Understanding Relating to article 1,
supra note 4; Protocol I, supra note 3.
44. Mark A. Drumbl, International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law,
and Environmental Security: Can the International Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?, 6
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 319−21 (2000).
45. Id. at 322.
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ICC is precluded from asserting jurisdiction in countries with functioning
legal mechanisms that can address environmental crimes.46
The Additional Protocol and Rome Statute share the further drawback
that neither has been ratified by the United States,47 a nation whose participation in large-scale military activities worldwide48 makes its absence
particularly notable and troubling in terms of deterring environmental
damage through criminal prosecution. Though ENMOD has been ratified
by the United States, and has the further advantages of more precisely
defining the words “widespread, long-lasting or severe” and proscribing
environmental harm without regard to military necessity or advantage, it
has been held to ban only manipulation of the environment as a weapon,
as opposed to destruction of the environment as a collateral effect or intentional act.49

46. JOE SILLS, JEROME C. GLENN, ELIZABETH FLORESCU & THEODORE J. GORDON, U.S.
ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES IN MILITARY
ACTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)—U.N. PERSPECTIVES (APRIL
2001), available at http://www.acunu.org/millennium/es-icc.html.
47. Protocol I, supra note 3; Rome statute, supra note 5.
48. For example, the United States supplied most of the weapons used by Israel in its
recent bombing campaign against Lebanon. DEMOCRACY NOW!: U.S. Arming of Israel: How U.S. Weapons Manufacturers Profit From Middle East Conflict, Interview
with Frida Berrigan, a Senior Research Associate with the Arms Trade Resource Center
and at the World Policy Institute [hereinafter U.S. Arming of Israel], http://www.
democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/07/21/1432202 (last visited Dec. 29, 2007). These
weapons are “part of a multimillion-dollar arms sale package approved last year that
Israel is able to draw on as needed.” David S. Cloud & Helene Cooper, U.S. Speeds Up
Bomb Delivery for the Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/world/middleeast/22military.html?ex=1311220800
&en=e256f1d8872a835d&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc.
49. Cohan, supra note 18, at 519 (citing Understanding Relating to Article I, Report
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.
27, at 91–92, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976)).
It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes of this Convention, the terms “widespread,” “long-lasting” and “severe” shall be interpreted as
follows: (a) “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; (b) “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or
approximately a season; (c) “severe”: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets. It is
further understood that the interpretation set forth above is intended exclusively
for this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the
same or similar terms if used in connection with any other international agreement.”
Id.
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Given the lack of clear guidelines and the heavy burdens of proof in
conventions addressing environmental war crimes, it is not surprising
that international criminal tribunals such as the ICC have failed to prosecute these crimes. Ad hoc tribunals are not well equipped to prosecute
war crimes either, since most of the tribunals are not directly empowered
to charge individuals for environmental destruction50 and thus must rely
on the conventions cited above. For example, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) failed to prosecute NATO for potential violations of articles 35 and 55 of Additional
Protocol I upon recommendation of the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign, which had determined that the
NATO bombing had not reached the threshold level of Additional Protocol I and that military necessity could have played a role in choosing targets.51
While criminal charges of environmental crimes seem to encounter insurmountable burdens of proof to prosecute, civil liability for such
crimes has been established with some success through at least one notable mechanism. Iraq’s liability for its “unlawful” invasion of Kuwait and
the resulting loss to “foreign government, nationals and corporations,”
including “environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources,” was declared in the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution
687, and through Resolution 692, the UNCC was established to administer payments.52

The last line indicates a reluctance to allow the standards defined here to apply in any
other context, and thereby become an international standard.
50. Weinstein, supra note 16, at 704−05. Weinstein points out that none of the following are either directly charged with or have jurisdiction over crimes against the environment: the Internal Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary
Chambers for Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone. Id.
51. Weinstein, supra note 16, at 704 (citing Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Final Report) ¶¶ 14−25, available at http://www.un.org
/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm). The Final Report argues that prosecution of NATO for
war crimes is not warranted on several grounds, namely that (1) France and the United
States have not ratified Additional Protocol I; (2) application of articles 35 and 55 is “extremely stringent and their scope and contents imprecise” and that the cumulative standard contributes to this high threshold for application; and (3) that the difficulty of proving the mens rea of intentionality as well as the balancing factor of military necessity
and/or advantage led the Commission to its decision not to recommend prosecution of
NATO for environmental war crimes. Id.
52. Huston, supra note 8, at 911 (citing S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991)).
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Though the UNCC can be termed successful in some respects, having
awarded $14 trillion in compensation to 1,506,458 claimants,53 there
were some drawbacks to this mechanism. First of all, out of the six categories of claims (A through F) established by the UNCC to compensate
individuals, corporations, governments and international organizations,
the category F claims for environmental damages were the lowest priority of claims.54 The fact that ten years passed before the first award of
environmental damages illustrates this well.55 Cash flow was also a problem in distributing the awards as Iraq was not cooperative in exporting
the oil that would generate revenue for the fund.56 What is of greater
concern is whether the UNCC is a viable type of mechanism to compensate for environmental losses by other violators, such as Israel, or for that
matter, Hezbollah, whose rockets burned thousands of acres of Israeli
forests.57 It is especially problematic to extract the necessary funding for
such clean-ups from non-state entities in terms of gaining access to their
wealth.58 What is promising about the UNCC though is that the claims
brought against Iraq for environmental harms considered not justifiable
by military necessity and violative of the laws of proportionality, as argued by the United States, and violative of Additional Protocol I and
ENMOD, as argued by other states,59 strengthen the argument that customary law prohibits excessive environmental destruction inflicted during war.
IV. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND AN ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINES
LIMITING ITS APPLICATION
The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), enacted in 1789, states that
“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”60 The ATCA was little known or employed
53. Id. at 917.
54. Id. at 912.
55. Id. at 913.
56. Id. at 915–16.
57. Dina Kraft, Dry Forests in Northern Israel are Damaged as Hezbollah’s Rocket
Attacks Ignite Fires, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2006/08/08/world/middleeast/08fires.html. An estimated 9000 acres of land and
almost 3000 acres of forest have been damaged by fire resulting from the firing of rockets
across the Israeli-Lebanon border.
58. Huston, supra note 8, at 919. Huston cites Al Qaeda as an example of a terrorist
organization that caused environmental damage in the September 11 attack and the difficulties in “identify[ing] and gain[ing] access to all their funding sources.” Id.
59. Schmitt, supra note 33, at 27−28.
60. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
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until 1978 when Paraguayan immigrants living in the United States
brought suit against a former Paraguayan policeman, Filartiga, who they
accused of torturing and killing their son in Paraguay years earlier.61 Filartiga established that the court had jurisdiction over claims that violated
“universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights”62
and that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority”
fell within that category.63 That such torture was a violation of universally accepted norms was proven by the “numerous international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy
by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice).”64 The court rejected the appellee’s claim “that the law of nations
forms a part of the laws of the United States only to the extent that Congress has acted to define it.”65
The Second Circuit ruling in Kadic v. Karadzic expanded liability under the ATCA to include private actors for certain violations of international law,66 including genocide67 and war crimes such as “murder, rape,
torture, and arbitrary detention of civilians.”68 Private entities such as
corporations have also been deemed liable for violations of international
law under the ATCA.69
However, there are ways in which courts have narrowed the scope of
jurisdiction over ATCA claims. The courts may narrow the scope of

61. Anne-Marie Slaughter and David L. Bosco, Alternative Justice, GLOBAL POLICY
FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2001/altjust.htm, last visited Mar. 4,
2008. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 880.
65. Id. at 886−87.
66. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). The court relied on the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §404
(1986) [hereinafter FOREL] to identify crimes for which individuals may be held liable
under international law. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
67. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242.
68. Id. at 242−44.
69. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff’s allegations of the corporate defendant’s complicity in forced labor, murder, and rape, if proven, sufficiently alleged violations of international law under the ATCA); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged human rights violations including torture, enslavement, war crimes, and genocide); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th
Cir. 2006) (plaintiffs alleging that an international mining company, with state assistance,
committed violations against international law including “racial discrimination, environmental devastation, war crimes and crimes against humanity”).
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what can determine international law70 or narrowly construe the range of
violations of international law cognizable under the ATCA.71 Furthermore, the courts will limit the application of the ATCA against private
individuals when they determine that the alleged violation of international law does not apply to non-state actors.72 ATCA claims have also
been rejected based on claims of forum non conveniens,73 exhaustion
requirements,74 or domestic and foreign policy considerations.75
Several jurisdictional bases for ATCA claims were narrowed under the
Supreme Court case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.76 First, the Court, restricting the kinds of claims cognizable under ATCA, found that it had
no jurisdiction under the ATCA to hear the appellee’s claims because
they did not fall within the “handful of heinous actions” that “violate[]
definable, universal and obligatory norms,”77 and hence there was no
violation of “customary international law so well defined as to support
the creation of a federal remedy.”78 In addition, the Court determined that
international agreements upon which the claimant relied to establish that
70. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734−35 (2004).
71. Id. at 732−733.
72. Kadic, 70 F.3d. at 243−44 (holding that individuals are only liable for torture if
acting in an official capacity).
73. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 476−480 (2d Cir. 2002).
74. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
75. See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7,
47−48 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.
76. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697, 736−37 (finding that the ATCA did not provide jurisdiction for Alvarez’s arbitrary detention claim when the claimant was abducted in Mexico
and brought to the U.S. for a criminal trial). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “[t]he unilateral, nonconsensual extraterritorial arrest and detention of
Alvarez were arbitrary and in violation of the law of nations under the ATCA.” AlvarezMachain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003). A central difference in judicial opinion revolves around the question of whether The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and/or the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) can impose obligations on the United States to recognize arbitrary detention
as a violation of international law. The 9th Circuit holds that they do impose such obligations in Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620−21, while the Supreme Court said that the
UDHR does not impose obligations on its own and that the ICCPR was not selfexecuting. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734−35.
77. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732−733 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
78. Id. at 738. The Court also held that “that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.” Id. at 732. Those historical paradigms were said to
include “offenses against ambassadors,” “violations of safe conduct,” and “individual
actions arising out of prize captures and piracy.” Id. at 720.
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arbitrary arrest was a violation of international law did not support his
claim, namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)
and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
The Court concluded that the UDHR has “moral authority” but does not
impose specific legal obligations, and that the ICCPR was not held to be
self-executing by the United States and therefore requires further Congressional action to enforce any of its precepts.79 The Court also rejected
the appellee’s assertion of binding customary law based on the prohibition against arbitrary detention in several state constitutions, as well as
judicial rulings on both an international and national (U.S.) level. The
Court maintained that the norm against arbitrary detention illustrated in
state constitutions was at “a high level of generality,” and that the Court
was unwilling to assert its federal judicial discretion over an arbitrary
detention claim based on customary international law.80 Finally, the
Court suggested that exhaustion of international tort claims may require
exhaustion in domestic courts or in other international tribunals.81
The argument that the ATCA was originally intended to cover a limited range of claims asserting violations of the law of nations has been
made by several courts.82 However, the bar has not been set so high as to
eliminate claims that do not rise to the level of jus cogens.83 Of course
79. Sosa, 542 U.S at 734−35.
80. Id. at 736−37 n.27.
81. Id. at 733 n.21. The Court cites the argument in the European Commission amicus
curiae’s brief that “basic principles of international law require that before asserting a
claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the
domestic legal system, and perhaps in others such as international claims tribunals.” Id.
82. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887−88; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719−20 (relying on An Act for
the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States § 8, 1 Stat. 113−114 and id.
§28, at 118, to infer that Congress intended to restrict ATCA jurisdiction to a “relatively
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations” including “offenses
against ambassadors,” “violations of safe conduct,” as well as “prize captures and piracy”). However, the Court in Sosa concedes that a consensus understanding of Congressional intent with respect to private actions subject to the jurisdictional provision of the
ATCA has proven elusive. Id. at 718−19. See also In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at
46−47.
83. Under article 53 of the Vienna Convention, a jus cogens (or peremptory) norm is:
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. The Court in Sosa does not discuss whether or not the violation
must rise to the level of a jus cogens violation. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. The court in Unocal
asserted that “[a]lthough a jus cogens violation is, by definition, a violation of specific,
universal, and obligatory international norms that is actionable under the ATCA, any
violation of specific, universal, and obligatory international norms—jus cogens or not—is
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the ultimate decision at to whether a given violation rises to the level of a
norm that is “definable, universal and obligatory”84 is based on what
sources of international law the court is willing to accept. In Sosa, the
Supreme Court’s cursory rejection of the internationally recognized declarations and agreements cited to support the ATCA claims was founded
on insubstantial analysis compared to other jurisprudence.85 Furthermore,
the Court refused to acknowledge appropriate sources of customary international law86 on the grounds that the norms thus embodied in various
documents were too general,87 and that courts that have held otherwise
simply go further than the Supreme Court was willing to go,88 suggesting
that the Court circumscribed the limits based on nothing more than its
own desire to do so.
With regard to non-state actors, courts have determined that liability
under the ATCA is limited to “certain forms of conduct [that] violate the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of
a state or only as private individuals.”89 Included among those violations
actionable under the ATCA.” Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945, n.15 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotes and citations omitted).
84. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781).
85. The Sosa court cites one source to support its assertion that the UDHR is merely
moral authority; the Court references Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement that the UDHR is
“not a treaty or international agreement . . . impos[ing] legal obligations.” Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 734−35. This is in notable contrast to the evidence cited by the Filartiga court that the
UDHR provides much more than moral authority. The Filartiga court cites several U.N.
issued statements regarding the U.N. Charter, which include the statement that a U.N.
Declaration is “a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated” (emphasis added) and that
“insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by
custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States.” Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 883 (citing 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn.4/1/610 (1962)).
Filartiga also cites a source that states that the UDHR “no longer fits into the dichotomy
of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding pronouncement’ but is rather an authoritative
statement of the international community.” Id. at 883 (citing E. Schwelb, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964)).
86. Such sources of customary law have been held to consist of “general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation,” which in turn
can be established by international agreements inasmuch as they represent the practice of
states. In addition, general principles of law, as practiced by states on a domestic level
“may sometimes convert such a principle into a rule of customary law.” FOREL, supra
note 66, § 102. Thus the Court’s cursory rejection of the UDHR, the ICCPR and the domestic law of states is misguided. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734−35.
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736−37 n.27.
88. Id. at 737 n.27.
89. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. To support its assertion that liability exists for non-state
actors, the court relies on historical evidence that individuals such as pirates were prose-
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are genocide, war crimes, and forced labor, while torture is an act that
only makes those acting in an official capacity liable under the ATCA.90
However, several theories exist for holding private actors liable when
they are intertwined with state actors who violate international law, thus
broadening the scope of liability for private actors.91 This issue is particularly relevant for holding corporate actors liable under the ATCA for
violations that do not violate peremptory norms.92 With respect to environmental war crime, there is evidence that it has not reached that level
of universal condemnation.93
The exhaustion requirement that the Supreme Court in Sosa mentions
in passing was not applicable there,94 but has been discussed in other

cuted under the law of nations (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 161
(1820)). The Court cites the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1986), which states that “[i]ndividuals may be held liable for offenses
against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.” FOREL, supra note
66, pt. II, introductory note. The court goes on to note the Restatement’s extension to
other violations of “universal concern.” Id. at 239−40.
90. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241−44 (finding that genocide and war crimes constitute violations of international law for which individuals are liable; also finding that torture is not
included in this category); Unocal, 395 F.3d at 946–948 (finding that private actors are
liable for forced labor under the ATCA).
91. Theories that expand private actors’ liability under international law include the
joint-action theory, acting under color of law, and aiding and abetting. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (finding that private actors are “considered state
actors if they are willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents”) (citations omitted); Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 245 (finding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[a] private
individual acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid”) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 n.5 (2006)
(holding that “violations of the laws of nations have always encompassed vicarious liability”).
92. Peremptory norms are also known as jus cogens norms. See Vienna Convention,
supra note 83, art. 53.
93. For example, FOREL § 404 cmt. (a) states that “[u]niversal jurisdiction over the
specified offenses is a result of universal condemnation of those activities and general
interest in cooperating to suppress them, as reflected in widely-accepted international
agreements and resolutions of international organizations. These offenses are subject to
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.” It includes violations such as “piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism . . . .” Id. It may be difficult at this stage to show that environmental war crimes are proscribed in widely accepted international agreements.
94. The Court made reference to the amicus brief of the European Commission,
which asserted that “basic principles of international law require that before asserting a
claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the
domestic legal system, and perhaps in other forums such as international claims tribu-
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cases.95 Though exhaustion is clearly an element of the Torture Victims
Protection Act (“TVPA”) (codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 like the
ATCA),96 there is no clear consensus among courts that it need apply to
other claims brought under the ATCA.97 It is thus not an insurmountable
barrier. Furthermore, even if a court did require exhaustion, this would
be excused in cases in which the plaintiff’s efforts in the forum state
would be futile.98
Other courts have accepted defendants’ motions to dismiss ATCA
claims arguing on forum non conveniens grounds.99 The two-prong test
nals.” However, the Court did not deem it appropriate to apply in the case at hand. Sosa,
542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
95. See, e.g., Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1089−90.
96. The TVPA states that “[a] court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if
the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
97. For example, the court in Sarei refused to require exhaustion because it found that
the legislative history of the ATCA did not reflect unambiguously Congress’s intent that
“international exhaustion was required . . . before an ATCA claim could be heard in a
U.S. court.” Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1093. The Sarei court also points out the lack of consensus
in several ATCA cases. Id. at 1089. It cites decisions that do not require exhaustion, see,
e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544−58 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467−76 (9th Cir. 1994), as well as opinions that do suggest that exhaustion might be appropriate under the ATCA, see, e.g.,
Judge Cudahy’s opinion in Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F. 3d 877, 889−90 (7th Cir. 2005).
Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1089. However, the Sarei court concludes that because Congress has
not clearly mandated exhaustion for ATCA claims, “sound judicial discretion” governs
whether or not exhaustion will be required. Id. at 1090.
98. See Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 343 n.44 (finding that no precedent
exists for enforcing exhaustion requirements when efforts to do so would be futile).
99. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476−80; Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp.
2d 510, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This has been an especially effective defense in cases involving environmental pollution. Lorelle Londis, The Corporate Face of The Alien Tort
Claims Act: How an Old Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 181−85 (2005) (citing Jeffrey B. Gracer, Protecting Citizens of
Other Countries, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES
TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISK 727–28 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999). In footnote 314, Londis cites Gerrard’s string cite of cases to illustrate the frequency of dismissal of environmental claims on forum non conveniens grounds: Torres v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing toxic tort suit brought by
700 Peruvian citizens against copper company); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant
Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part, modified in part, 809 F.2d
1295 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 871 (1987) (dismissing action against Union
Carbide for a catastrophic leak of methyl icocyanate in Bhopal, India); Delgado v. Shell
Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (dismissing actions brought by farm workers
from 23 countries alleging chemical exposure); Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F. Supp. 61
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing suit Ecuadoreans alleging massive air, soil, and water contamination). Id. at 182 n.314.
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applied by the courts100 tends to favor the defendants in ATCA cases because the first prong considers the adequacy of the alternative forum recommended by the defendant, and in the interests of comity, U.S. courts
are reluctant to offend the foreign state by finding it inadequate.101 There
is clearly some overlap between finding exhaustion claims futile and the
ruling under the doctrine of forum non conveniens claim that the foreign
forum is inadequate. Thus a plaintiff could prevail on both motions to
dismiss if it is demonstrated that no feasible alternative forum exists.
With respect to the second prong of the forum non conveniens test, balancing public and private interest in litigating in the chosen forum, courts
may consider the policy interest of the United States in determining public interest and could find that dismissal on this basis may “frustrate
Congress’s intent to provide a federal forum for aliens suing domestic
entities for violation of the law of nations.”102 Thus, the policy interests
of the United States could play a role in determining the public interest in
allowing a U.S. forum for adjudication.103
One of the main barriers to ATCA claims is the reluctance of courts to
interfere with U.S. foreign policy.104 Two prudential doctrines that courts
draw upon in assessing whether the judiciary can assert itself in a given

100. The court “first considers whether an adequate forum exists. If so, it must then
balance a series of factors involving the private interests of the parties in maintaining the
litigation in the competing fora and any public interests at stake.” Aguinda, 303 F.3d at
476 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Private interests have been held to include
access to evidence and witness amenability, while public interest factors consider the
public’s interest in the controversy as well as the administrative burden placed on courts
in presiding over the case and applying foreign law. Londis, supra note 99, at 182 (citing
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal citations
omitted).
101. Londis, supra note 99, at 185. Londis also points out that dismissal on these procedural grounds may also be favored because it is less controversial than prudential doctrines such as the political question. Id. at 185.
102. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Jota
v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998)).
103. For example, the court in Wiwa views the TVPA as expressing a policy in favor
of allowing U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over cases of torture. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105.
Factors also cited by the court in overturning the dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens included the fact that two plaintiffs were residents of the United States, the “very
substantial expense and inconvenience” that would be imposed on the plaintiffs were the
suit to be dismissed in favor of the foreign forum, and that the inconvenience to the defendants was minimal. Id. at 106.
104. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (finding that allowing the suit
to proceed would interfere with the U.S. government’s negotiation of war reparations
with Vietnam, thus “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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ATCA case are the political question doctrine and act of state doctrine.105
The political question doctrine consists of a six factor test that focuses
primarily on whether a judicial decision would undermine the authority
of the executive or legislative branches.106 The act of state doctrine focuses more specifically on the consequences a judgment regarding a foreign state may have on U.S. foreign policy.107 However, courts have held
that political questions do not automatically prevent courts from determining the legality of executive action.108 An implicit part of the court’s
determination of how much weight to give this factor is the political
pressure applied to the judiciary by the executive branch.109
105. The act of state and/or political question doctrines have been invoked in a number
of notable ATCA cases. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 796; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 248−49;
In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 48; Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1079, 1084.
106. The six factors discussed in Baker v. Carr are:
(1) the matter is constitutionally committed to a coordinate branch of government; (2) no “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” exist to guide
the court’s analysis; (3) it is impossible to decide the case without making an
initial policy determination that should rightfully be made by a separate branch;
(4) deciding the case would express “a lack of respect” to a coordinate branch
of government; (5) there is “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made;” or (6) the potential embarrassment to the U.S.
government could arise as a result of “multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.”
Londis, supra note 99, at 186 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). In Sarei,
the court addressed factors one, four, five and six. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1079.
107. The act of state doctrine “prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of
the public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory.”
Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1084 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401
(1964)). Thus an action may be dismissed if “(1) there is an ‘official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory’; and (2) ‘the relief sought or the defense interposed [would require] a court in the United States to declare invalid the [foreign sovereign’s] official act.’” Id. at 1084 (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)).
108. “[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Londis, supra note 99, at 186 (citing Baker, 369
U.S. at 211). Courts should investigate the history of the issue in question to determine
whether it is “susceptible to ‘judicial handling’ and consider ‘other possible consequences of judicial action.’” Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211−12).
109. Londis notes that statements of interest by the State and Justice Departments have
been influential in the courts’ decision to allow ATCA claims to proceed. In particular,
Londis observes that the Carter Administration supported Filartiga and that the Clinton
Administration supported plaintiffs in Kadic and Unocal; the author contrasts that with
the position of the Bush Administration, which did not support plaintiffs in Doe v. Exxon
Mobil, nor in Sarei v. Rio Tinto. The successful suits were ones in which the executive
branch had not argued against the plaintiffs. Londis, supra note 99, at 188−91 (cases
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V. APPLICATION OF THE ATCA AGAINST MILITARY DEFENSE
CONTRACTORS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL WAR CRIMES
In an ATCA case brought against military defense contractors, defendants would seek to invoke one or more of these barriers. The defenses
they are most likely to rely on include the claim that environmental
harms do not constitute the “handful of heinous crimes” cognizable under the ATCA.110 Further, they might allege that even if such violations
are cognizable under the ATCA, they are not jus cogens violations and
thus require state action; state action could then suffice to persuade
judges that the suit infringes on the government’s right to determine foreign policy.111 The problem of state action will be discussed below,
where it is maintained that the defendants’ actions are clearly implicated
in illegal state conduct.
As U.S. defense contractors are among the leaders in weapons manufacturing internationally,112 it is likely that they could be defendants in
cited include Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Nat’l Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 340 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp. (No. 01-1357) (D.D.C. filed June 20, 2001); Sarei, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). The court’s decision with respect to the political question issue in
Sarei was overruled. Sarei, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). The court found that the
statement of interest provided by the government did not establish that a political question precluding judicial oversight existed. Id. at 1083.
110. For example, the court in Beanal determined that the plaintiff’s allegations of
violations of international law with respect to the environment relied upon treaties that
merely referred to a “general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract
rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts,” and thus were
not cognizable under the ATCA. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161,
167 (5th Cir. 1999).
111. While the decision to wage war is certainly a state decision with serious political
repercussions, the courts do not refuse to hear cases solely because they implicate political questions. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 64. The court noted that
even when a case “may call for an assessment of the President’s actions during wartime,”
this was “no reason for a court to abstain” and “that [p]residential powers are limited
even in wartime.” Id. at 64. Furthermore, the court declared that “[i]t is not a defense that
the spraying of herbicides was on orders of the President: Authorization by the head of
government does not provide carte blanche for a private defendant to harm individualism
violation of international law.” The court noted further that “[i]n the Third Reich all power of the state was centered in Hitler; yet his orders did not serve as a defense at Nuremberg. Justiciability is not eliminated because of possible interference with executive power even in wartime.” See also Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1081–84 (finding that the political question raised by the defense failed to bar jurisdiction despite the statement of interest provided by the government).
112. For example, in a list of the top one-hundred world leaders in the defense industry, forty-three of the top one hundred were U.S. companies; the top ten included seven
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ATCA litigation. Thus, this Note will seek to establish links between the
U.S. government and these industries to demonstrate the viability of the
ATCA in the context of a war-related environmental harm.
There is ample evidence that the defense industry has deep ties to the
political regime in the United States.113 It is not surprising that the industry cultivates such ties given the fact that U.S. decisions to engage in military operations bring financial windfalls to companies that manufacture
weapons.114 With so much money at stake, these corporations invest considerable sums to persuade Congress to award them lucrative defense
contracts.115 This lobbying effort, in turn, is likely to pay off, especially
in the current administration where policy makers have extensive financial ties to the arms industry.116 In fact, the huge contracts awarded such
defense contractors as Lockheed Martin suggest that these governmentU.S. companies, including Lockheed Martin, which was ranked number one. Defense
News Top 100, DEFENSENEWS.COM, available at http://dfn.dnmediagroup.com/index.
php?S=06top100 (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
113. See infra note 116 (providing information regarding the personnel links between
the government and military contractors).
114. Evidence of the financial rewards associated with U.S. military engagement include a rise in stock shares in several major weapons manufacturing corporations including Northrop Grumman (increases in stock prices following September 11 and after
bombing in Afghanistan began), Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin. Frida Berrigan, The
War Profiteers: How are Weapons Manufacturers Faring in the War?, COMMON DREAMS
NEWSCENTER, Dec. 18, 2001, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views01
/1218-03.htm.
115. For example, Lockheed Martin invested over $9.8 million lobbying Congress in
2000. Berrigan, supra note 114. See also supra, note 117 (regarding the dollar amount of
Lockheed’s contract in 2000 and 2001).
116. As of May 2002, the Bush Administration had thirty-two policy makers with
“significant financial ties to the arms industry” before their appointments, including Vice
President Cheney and his wife Lynne, who received more than $500,000 as a director on
the board of Lockheed Martin from 1994–2001. William D. Hartung & Jonathan Reingold, About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush Administration’s Radical
Reversal of Two Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy, THE GLOBAL POLICY INSTITUTE, May
2002, at 13, available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/About
Face5.6.02.pdf (see “Through the Revolving Door”) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). Other
notable members of the administration at this time (May 2002) with such ties included
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Cheney’s
Chief of Staff, Secretary of State Colin Powell, among several others. Id. at 20. Besides
seeking influence by lobbying Congress directly, numerous weapons contractors such as
Boeing, General Atomics, General Dynamics, Litton, Lockheed Martin, Northrop
Grumman, Textron, Thiokol and TRW, have donated money to the corporate think-tank
Center for Security Policy (“CSP”), which advocates the development of nuclear weapons and opposes arms control agreements. CSP, in turn, has “close ties to influential legislators . . . in the forefront of influencing U.S. nuclear and missile defense policies.”
Several of these legislators sit on the board of CSP. Id. at 28.
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corporate interrelationships have proven very beneficial to the industry.117 Furthermore, the development of Pentagon policy has also been
shaped by the cooperative advocacy of conservative think-tanks staffed
by numerous individuals who work for defense contractors.118 Attempts
to influence military engagement do not stop at helping to shape policy
or lobbying for contracts. There is evidence that defense contractors actively engage in campaigning for military action.119
The links between the defense industry and the state here go beyond an
overlap of personnel and philosophy of war-making. The development of
military technology is a shared enterprise of the government and the contractors. The Pentagon works with the contractors to design weapons120
and can exert control over the distribution of such technology worldwide.121
117. Lockheed Martin had contracts worth almost $30 billion in fiscal years 2000 and
2001 alone. Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116, at 14.
118. The National Institute for Public Policy (“NIPP”) produced a report that considerably influenced the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review, evidenced by the similarity of
logic and language found in both documents. NIPP, in turn has board members who are
directly engaged in the weapons manufacturing industry, such as Charles Kupperman,
Vice President for National Missile Defense Programs at Lockheed Martin. Hartung &
Reingold, supra note 116, at 30.
119. Lockheed’s former vice-president Bruce Jackson was chair of the Coalition for
the Liberation of Iraq, a group that promoted Bush’s plan to invade Iraq. Jackson was
also involved in securing support for the war in Eastern Europe; Jackson even provided
assistance in drafting the letter of endorsement for such military intervention for these
countries. Corpwatch: Lockheed Martin, Corpwatch.org, available at http://www.
corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type=9^printsafe=1, (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
120. For example, the Pentagon communicates its needs to contractors by “simulat[ing] the features and performances of weapon systems in computers” before the contractors begin production. Joshua A. Kutner, Robust Weapons Simulations Hinge on
Close Collaboration, NATIONAL DEFENSE BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE, Jan.
2001, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Jan/Robust
_Weapon.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). This simulations-based acquisition system
(“SBA”) allows “[t]he military services and contractors [to] work together to simulate all
aspects of a weapon system, such as design and performance, leading up to the development of a prototype. The military customer tells the contractor what properties it wants
the system to have, and the contractor incorporates those into the simulation. The contractor then can offer suggestions to improve the system.” Id. The Joint Strike Fighter
(“JSF”) and the DD-21 surface combatant were products of such a collaboration. Id.
Lockheed Martin is a manufacturer of the JSF. Lockheed Martin, JSF Program, available
at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/f35/JSFProgram.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2008). Northrop Grumman was given a contract to build the DD 21 in 1998. Press Release, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (Aug. 17, 1998), available at http://www.ss.
northropgrumman.com/press/news/m_08_17_98.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
121. For example, the Pentagon expressed reluctance to share the technology associated with the Joint Strike Fighter. Renae Merle, Iraq Coverage Helps Arms Exporters,
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Furthermore, with the increasing reliance of the government on private
military contractors122 to carry out a wide range of duties, the link between the state and the contractors has grown tighter. Contractors known
for their weapons manufacturing capability are now branching out to
provide other services such as training military personnel and providing
interrogators for prisons.123
Given the substantial links between the military contractors and the
state, their aligned efforts in establishing policy,124 developing weapons,
and engaging in other war-time activities,125 the actions of private military contractors can clearly be linked to the state for the purposes of finding liability for environmental war crimes under the ATCA.126
The color of law rule derived from Kadic,127 that a private individual or
entity acts under color of law when acting “together with state officials
Corpwatch.org, Apr. 1, 2003, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=
7871&printsafe=1 (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). The Joint Strike Fighter is a combat jet
built by Lockheed pursuant to a contract worth $200 billion. War Profiteer of the Month:
Lockheed Martin, Corpwatch.org, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type
=9&all=1(last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
122. During the first Gulf War in 1991, the ratio of contractors to military personnel
was 1:50; in the 2003 conflict, it was 1:10. David Isenberg, A Fistful of Contractors: The
Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq, PMC Sector: A
Marriage Between Government and the Private Sector, AMERICAN BRITISH SECURITY
INFORMATION COUNCIL, available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2ii
.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
123. For example, Northrop Grumman’s subsidiary, Vinnell Corporation obtained a
forty-eight million dollar contract to train the Iraqi National Army. Corpwatch: Northrop
Grumman, Corpwatch.org, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list
=type&type=11&printsafe=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). Also, Sytex, a subsidiary of
Lockheed, plays a significant role recruiting private interrogators operating in U.S.-run
prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Pratap Chatterjee, Meet the New Interrogators:
Lockheed Martin, Corpwatch.org, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.corpwatch.org
/article.php?id=12757.
124. Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116.
125. See supra notes 118 and 119.
126. Courts have found private actors can be implicated in state action under several
theories including the theories of joint-action with a state, acting under color of law, and
aiding and abetting state actors. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that state actors are “considered
state actors if they are willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents”)
(citations omitted); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[a] private individual acts under color of law within the meaning
of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid”)
(citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
456 F.3d 1069, 1078 n.5 (2006) (holding that “violations of the law of nations have always encompassed vicarious liability”).
127. Kadic, 70 F. 3d 232.

652

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:2

or significant state aid”128 is applicable here. The defense contractors
work with state officials to shape policy and develop weapons.129 They
also receive significant state aid in securing contracts, given the close
relationship that exists between the contractors and their representatives
in the administration.130 Secondly, the aiding and abetting theory articulated by the court in Unocal,131 holding liable a private entity that provides “practical assistance or encouragement which has substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime,” applies to defense contractors as
well.132 The practical assistance is found in many instances: designing
weapons, training personnel to use aircraft, and other operations.133 The
encouragement is found in active lobbying and policy-making efforts.134
The perpetration of the environmental war crime is thus the result of
teamwork between the state and the defense contractor.135
CONCLUSION
The potential for massive casualties and irrevocable environmental
harm in armed conflict is greater today than ever before. The salting of
fields in Carthage, or the burning of crops and killing of livestock, are
trivial events compared to the long term environmental disasters brought
on by modern day weaponry, and the intensive assaults that they afford
the military. Furthermore, there exists no criminal justice mechanism
sufficient to bring rogue states to justice;136 states are also shielded by the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity against civil litigation.137 When
128. Id. at 245.
129. See supra notes 116 (policy) and 120 (developing weapons).
130. Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116, at 30.
131. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947.
132. Id.
133. See Kutner, supra note 20.
134. See Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116, at 30.
135. In domestic lawsuits, military contractors have resorted to the military contractor
defense. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir.
1987) (finding that the defense contractor is shielded from liabilities “for injuries caused
by products ordered by the government for a distinctly military use, so long as it informs
the government of known hazards or the information possessed by the government regarding those hazards is equal to that possessed by the contractor.” However, when this
defense was asserted in a lawsuit against Dow Chemical (producers of Agent Orange)
under the ATCA, the court held that it was invalid.
136. Supra pages 9–13 and accompanying text explaining the failure of international
mechanisms to punish those who commit environmental war crimes.
137. See FOREL, supra note 66, § 451. “Under international law, a state or state instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private
persons.” Id. Section 451 also discusses U.S. adherence to the “restrictive theory of im-
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the same privileges of immunity are extended to corporations involved in
warfare, accountability for humanitarian violations ceases.138
States in the international community implicitly acknowledge that the
victims of decisions to destroy the infrastructure and environment are
entitled to compensation.139 However, one problem is the funding of such
compensation. Under the current regime of accountability, U.S. taxpayers are compelled to pay for weapons designed to safeguard their own
country, and often to subsidize the weaponry of a foreign state.140 The
state may justify this in the interests of national security. On the other
hand, the taxpayer is billed again to clean up the damage done, while
corporate entities reap the profits and incur none of the liabilities.
The goal of ATCA suits is twofold: heightening public awareness of
environmental war crimes and those who perpetrate them and compensating the victims of the crimes, which in this case means providing the
funds to restore the environment as much as possible to its condition
prior to the armed attack. The ATCA has been asserted with mixed results.141 When successful, it may fail to bring financial relief,142 though it
munity,” which maintains that “a state is immune from any exercise of judicial jurisdiction by another state in respect of claims arising out of governmental activities.” Id. at
cmt. a. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 articulates exceptions to the immunity, stating that the actions
of the foreign state must either occur in, or have a direct effect on the United States. See §
1605(a)(1)–(5).
138. Adding weight to this argument is the point made by Londis that nation states
have “diminished power . . . in the globalized context,” while “[c]orporations are . . .
immensely powerful (often more so than governments) yet highly unregulated.” Londis,
supra note 99 at 180. Londis also points out that transnational corporations “are both
public and private entities—public actors engaged in ventures with foreign governments,
and private actors engaged in business for profit” such that “the distinction between public and private breaks down.” Thus, the corporation comes less and less to represent the
interests of the state. “Consequently, [such corporations] may be held to the rule of international law without disrupting the relationships among nation-states.” Id. at 195.
139. The United Nations Compensation Commission fund is an example of such recognition. The United Nations Compensation Commission, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
140. For example, Berrigan asserts that “the United States provides 20% of the Israeli
military budget on an annual basis, and then about 70% of that money provided by the
United States, from U.S. taxpayers, to Israel is then spent on weapons from Lockheed
Martin and Boeing and Raytheon.” U.S. Arming of Israel, supra note 48 (last visited Jan.
31, 2008).
141. Of the thirty-six corporate ATCA cases brought over the past thirteen years, twenty have been dismissed (three quarters of these on substantive legal grounds and one
quarter on procedural grounds). “Three have been settled out of court and 13 are ongoing.” Baue, supra note 15, at 12.
142. For example, Bosnian plaintiffs suing General Karadzic for human rights abuses
under the ATCA were awarded $4.5 billion but have not been able to collect that award.
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may provide a sense of closure or satisfaction to the victims, as well as
international attention to the crimes perpetrated against them. Other
times, the plaintiffs have not won in court but have been able to negotiate
settlements; this is particularly true in the context of suits against corporations.143 That the ATCA has potential as a means of deterring corporate
misfeasors is evidenced in the way it is perceived as a serious threat by
some corporate advocates.144 Another view of this potential is a positive
one—it can be used to redress violations that as of yet have not been seriously addressed by the international community. It may not be a “weapon of mass destruction” but it certainly is a means to pierce the immunity of state-like corporations who wield their strength to destroy the environment and are never forced to pay the consequences for their actions.
That the state actively encourages such behavior is not an adequate defense, especially when the representatives of the state and the corporate
leaders are often of one mind.
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